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Introduction
Much attention has been paid to corporate executives, particularly CEOs, given their impact on firm policies and performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) . Recently, the question which skills and traits enable executives to successfully manage their firms and whether these skills and traits explain differences in executive pay has drawn particular attention (see, e.g., Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2010; Falato, Li, and Milbourn, 2015; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013, 2016) .
Among executives, generalists -who possess broad managerial work experience -have been shown to account for a growing share of management and to receive significant hiring and pay premia (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013) , presumably due to an increasing demand for general managerial ability (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004) . These trends indicate that generalist executives are important to modern corporations and that they can be expected to benefit corporate shareholders.1 Against this background, we test the hypothesis that executives' general managerial ability has a positive impact on shareholder value.
We find strong support for our hypothesis using a sample of 171 sudden executive (CEOs, chairmen, and presidents) deaths. The stock price reaction to announcements of these deaths equals a deceased executive's expected contribution to shareholder value net of the expected replacement.
Thus, the approach allows to measure the value of general managerial skills as long as they are costly (difficult) to replace. This assumption appears reasonable given the increasing demand for 1 This expectation is based on the theoretical assumption of a competitive assignment of executives to firms (see, e.g., Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013, Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008) which suggests that executives with general managerial skills receive a hiring premium because these skills are expected to have a positive effect on firm value. Anecdotal evidence supports the view that generalists are valuable and have become increasingly important. See, for example, "New Problems, New Approaches: The Rise of the Generalist" (Forbes.com on 12/28/2013): " […] companies are in need of Generalists with new, agile skills that can see the big picture, listen, synthesize ideas and connect the dots.
[…] They bring expertise and experience in several areas, fueled by insatiable curiosity and the ability to "hyper-learn" new concepts and ideas".
generalists and the hiring premium they receive, consistent with the increasing competition for managerial talent (see, e.g., Frydman, 2014 , Terviö, 2008 . As sudden deaths occur randomly, the approach mitigates endogeneity concerns. It particularly addresses the endogenous executive-firm match which typically distorts inferences about the value of executives.
Regarding the value and growing importance of generalists for modern corporations, several studies (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004, 2007; Bertrand, 2009; Ferreira and Sah, 2012) propose that the need for executives with general managerial ability has increased due to severe organizational and technological changes and growing competition. Specifically, while firms have become more complex (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006) , their organizational structures have considerably flattened (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf, 2014) . This has led to more problem solving at the top, more interactions of executives with people inside and outside the firm, and to a higher impact of corporate leaders on firm value. As a consequence, work experience in different industries, firms and positions, including knowledge of accounting, finance, investor relations, marketing and sales, has become increasingly important. The incorporation of computers and the internet into everyday business has augmented this need for general managerial skills as it reduced the costs of acquiring knowledge and communication and reinforced the growing scope of control for top executives (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Garicano, 2000) . Furthermore, Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2015) provide recent evidence that firms managed by generalists are more innovative (i.e., produce more cited patents). In all, based on the literature generalists can be expected to have a positive impact on shareholder value.
Consistent with this expectation, we find that the stock market attributes a significantly higher contribution to shareholder value to deceased executives with more general managerial skills as reflected by a larger stock price decline around announcements of sudden executive deaths. In particular, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the general ability index, proposed by Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) , is associated with an economically meaningful and statistically significant average decrease in abnormal stock returns of at least 1.5 percentage points.2 This result is robust to controls for executive, firm and governance characteristics and does not hinge on how we calculate abnormal stock returns or the managerial ability index.
Although our approach mitigates endogeneity concerns, we perform a large set of additional tests to validate our results. First, we separately analyze the components of the general ability index.
The results complement our findings as they suggest which type of managerial work experience shareholders consider to be particularly valuable (and costly to replace). We find that work experience in different positions, firms and industries have a statistically significant, negative effect on abnormal stock returns to sudden executive deaths. Among these components, industry experience is found to have the largest economic effect. This analysis provides further support for our hypothesis that generalists are beneficial to corporate shareholders.
Second, an important concern in the context of our study is that our results are driven by outliers given that the number of sudden executive deaths is limited, while the stock market reaction to these events is typically volatile with large negative and large positive stock returns (see Nguyen and Nielsen, 2014) . We address this concern in two ways. First, we perform median regressions which minimize the sum of absolute (instead of squared) residuals. Further, we reestimate our regressions and simultaneously exclude outliers in the managerial ability index and outliers in abnormal stock returns. Both tests confirm our previous results. Moreover, when we standardize abnormal stock returns with their pre-event volatility, our results remain qualitatively similar.
2 Most of our analyses focus on deceased CEOs and deceased presidents (i.e., the designated CEOs or "heir apparents", see Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) who are most likely to need general managerial skills in their day-to-day work life. Results remain qualitatively similar, but smaller in terms of economic magnitude, when we include deceased chairmen who were neither CEOs nor presidents. We find no statistically significant effect of general managerial skills for these chairmen.
Third, another important concern is that the effect of general managerial skills actually is the outcome of alternative explanations. For example, the managerial ability index might capture executives' innate talent, which could be both costly to replace and beneficial for shareholders, and which might thus explain the negative stock market reaction to unexpected deaths of generalists.
To address this concern, we use several established measures of executive talent as additional control variables. Specifically, we use an executive's education and age of first appointment to CEO (similar to Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013) as well as the ratio of an executive's tenure to her age (as in Bhagat and Bolton, 2013) . Another explanation for our results is that general managerial ability correlates with executives' valuable networks which are lost when executives die. Thus, we use an executive's number of outside directorships and an indicator whether she attended an elite (Ivy League) school to control for networks valuable to corporate shareholders.
We further control for time and industry effects which might drive our results. None of the aforementioned alternative explanations seem to explain our finding of a positive impact of general managerial skills on shareholder value.
We perform several additional robustness tests to validate our findings. Particularly, we exclude small and young firms, which tend to be less able to attract corporate talent, from our sample to address the concern that our results might be driven by firms that find it hard to replace valuable executives. We also restrict our sample to those firms that replace a suddenly deceased executive from inside the firm. These cases account for more than 80% of all sudden death events, consistent with the high fraction of inside CEO replacements documented in the literature (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) . Further, we exclude cases of sudden deaths for which the cause of death is a heart attack or is unspecified as these cases might be related to firm performance. Finally, we use additional controls for executive (inside) succession and ownership, firm diversification, leverage and R&D expenses. The positive impact of general managerial skills on shareholder value is robust to all of the aforementioned tests.
In an additional analysis, we attempt to provide some insights with regard to the question for which firms generalist executives are particularly valuable. Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) find that the generalist pay premium is higher when CEOs are hired to perform difficult corporate tasks (e.g., restructurings) which necessitate adapting to changing business environments, coordinating with several people inside and outside the firm, and seeking new investments. This finding indicates that generalists can be expected to be particularly valuable in difficult situations, for example, because their broad managerial experience is likely to facilitate communication, learning, identifying new growth prospects and adapting to changing environments (as found in Guay, Taylor, and Xiao, 2014) . We thus hypothesize that the value of executives' general managerial skills is higher when firms have fewer growth prospects and, consequently, are more likely to be in need to perform difficult tasks, identify new investments, and adapt to changes.
Using several measures of firms' growth opportunities, we find strong support for our hypothesis.
The lower firms' growth prospects, and hence the more likely the need to perform difficult tasks, the more valuable are generalists to corporate shareholders.
Our study contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, the insights we present in this paper extend the recent literature concerned with the role of managerial work experience in corporate finance (e.g., Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Custódio and Metzger, 2013, 2014; Dittmar and Duchin, 2015; Schoar and Zuo, 2016) , particularly the literature on general managerial skills. In this regard, our results provide a market-based explanation for Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos' (2013) finding that generalist CEOs receive considerable hiring and pay premia (19% relative to specialists). Specifically, our evidence that executives' general managerial skills, which are transferable across companies, are associated with higher shareholder value can explain why firms seem to compete for generalists in the executive labor market (e.g., in a competitive assignment framework) and why they are willing to pay a hiring premium to attract these valuable executives. In terms of the value of generalists, Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) cannot detect a relation between their general ability index and performance in multivariate regressions. However, the authors remark that both firm performance and the CEO-firm match can be endogenous and that their tests may lack power. The problem of endogeneity in research on board structures and firm performance has been highlighted in the literature (see, e.g., Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010) . Our study attempts to overcome these problems by using sudden deaths as shocks that exogenously alter executives' general managerial skills in affected firms.
Second, the evidence we provide generally contributes to the literature on CEO heterogeneity and its relation to firm performance and shareholder value (e.g., Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon, 2010 Wolfenzon, , 2012 Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce, 2013; Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth, 2016; Johnson et al., 1985; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2014; Salas, 2010) . Our findings indicate that generalist executives are beneficial to corporate shareholders and the value of generalists varies with firms' growth prospects. Our study, hence, has practical implications as it suggests that corporate boards and executive search firms should take general managerial skills and prevailing economic circumstances into account when they seek new executives or plan executive succession.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe our sample and data in Section 2. Section 3 presents our main empirical results, while Section 4 provides various additional robustness tests. In Section 5, we analyze how generalists matter when firms have to perform difficult tasks. Conclusions follow.
Data and variables

Sample selection and data
To compile our sample of sudden executive (CEOs, chairmen and presidents) deaths for the period 1980 to 2012, we use the data from Salas (2010), who identifies suddenly deceased CEOs, chairmen and presidents, and complement it with data on sudden CEO deaths from Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2016) . The sample period in the two aforementioned studies ends in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Thus, for the years 2009 to 2012, we additionally hand-collect data on sudden executive deaths to increase sample size. We follow the existing literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 1985; Slovin and Sushka, 1993; Salas, 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2014) in terms of sample selection criteria. We search major news sources -in particular Google, LexisNexis, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Washington Post -for articles disclosing unexpected deaths of CEOs, presidents and chairmen of the board. We use keyword search terms such as "chief executive officer", "CEO", "president", "chairman", and "accident", "deceased", "heart attack", "stroke", "sudden(ly)" and "unexpected" to identify unexpected deaths. We exclude murders and suicides (which might be related to firm performance) and cases of deaths if they cannot be identified as sudden or unexpected.3 Figure 1 shows the distribution of causes of sudden deaths in our sample. 47% of all deaths are due to heart attacks, 28% are due to accidents and strokes, and the remaining 25% are cases of unspecified, but sudden and unexpected deaths. These numbers are almost identical to those reported in Nguyen and Nielsen (2014).
Because we examine the stock price reaction to the announcements of executives' sudden deaths, we require stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for all companies in our sample. We further require data on executives' work experience (to measure general managerial skills). Our final sample consists of 171 sudden executive deaths with available data on stock prices and executives' work experience. Deceased CEOs or presidents account for 134 (or 78%) of the deaths in our sample. Appendix A shows the distribution of sudden deaths over the sample period. 25% of all sudden deaths occurred during the 1980s, almost 39% during the 1990s, and the remaining 36% occurred between 2000 and 2012.
We complement our sample with accounting data (for the previous fiscal year) from Compustat as well as data on corporate governance and executives' characteristics and work experience. This data comes from proxy statements (in microfiche format for early years, if available), executive biographies from Capital IQ, LexisNexis as well as obituaries and other media announcements around sudden deaths.4 Unfortunately, we are not able to gather all relevant data for all firms in our sample. Accordingly, multivariate regression results are based on fewer observations.
Measuring general managerial skills
To measure general managerial skills, we use the general ability index (GAI) proposed by Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) . We follow the authors and calculate the variable GAI index based on equation (1) 
where i stands for the deceased executive i, X1 is the number of positions that the deceased has held (until the year of his or her death); X2 is the number of firms where the deceased has worked; 4 To facilitate the collection of executive data (particularly data on work experience), we partly automatized the data collection process using a web crawler for Google and different keywords. We started by using simply the name of the executive along with the company name as well as "DEF 14A" to get the relevant SEC filing. If the DEF 14A was not available on page 1 of the Google results, we simply crawled all results from Google's pages 1 to 10 by using the executive's name along with the company name. Usually, filings were available via SEC's EDGAR. In case no relevant results turned up, we crawled results of the executives together with the keywords "death", "dies" and "died". In several cases, press releases and obituaries provided the necessary information. We opened all results and again searched automatically for the keywords. After filtering irrelevant results, we browsed each document manually to obtain the data needed to construct the general ability index.
X3 is the number of industries in which the deceased has worked; X4 is a dummy variable equal to one if the deceased held a CEO position in another firm (zero otherwise); and X5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the deceased has worked in a multi-division conglomerate (zero otherwise).
The variable GAI index is only constructed if data on executives' work experience is available.
Larger GAI index values correspond to more general managerial skills. We standardize GAI index to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (to facilitate the interpretation of our results).
For robustness purposes, we use three alternative measures of the GAI index. First, we use an indicator variable Generalist, which equals one if the GAI index of an executive is larger than the median of the variable GAI index. Second, we use the variable GAI unweighted which is the unweighted GAI index defined as the sum of the unweighted components of the GAI index as shown in equation (1). It is used to address the concern that the weights proposed by Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) , which are derived from a principal components analysis, might not be appropriate in the context of our study. As a third variable, we use Residual GAI index which is the residual from a regression of GAI index on the following executive characteristics which tend to correlate with the GAI index: age, CEO status, founder status, tenure, and a dummy indicating whether the executive had work experience with either a consulting or a law firm.
Event study methodology and abnormal stock returns
To calculate abnormal stock returns, we obtain daily stock return data from CRSP for each of our 171 events for a 255-day pre-event estimation period (from trading day -274 to -20). We use the standard event study methodology with i) a single-factor (market model), ii) a three-factor model, and iii) a four-factor model and the value-weighted CRSP index as the market index, where beta is estimated using data from the pre-event window. We define the event date as the trading day on which the announcement of an executive's unexpected death first became public information, i.e., the day of the first public news of the sudden death. In case this day is a non-trading day, the event date is defined as the next trading day following the first public announcement of the sudden death.
As our main dependent variable, we use the cumulative abnormal return for the three days surrounding the event date (i.e., from t -1 to t +1, with t indicating the event date), denoted CAR (-1,1), similar to Nguyen and Nielsen (2014) . Specifically, we use the variables CAR (-1,1)_FF3 and CAR (-1,1)_MM, where FF3 and MM indicate that the three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) and the market model were used to calculate abnormal returns, respectively. For robustness purposes, we use three alternative measures of the stock market reaction to sudden deaths. CAR (-1,1)_4F, i.e., the four-factor model abnormal return (Carhart, 1997), SCAR (-1,1), which is defined as CAR (-1,1)_MM divided by a firm's standard deviation of abnormal stock returns from the estimation window, and CAR (-1,1)_MM < 0 (dummy), which is a dummy variable set to one if
Summary statistics
Summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1 . While Panel A presents summary statistics for all observations, Panel B is restricted to sudden deaths of CEOs and presidents, i.e., chairmen who are neither CEOs nor presidents are excluded. We focus on the summary statistics for the sample in Panel B, which is used in the majority of our later analyses. The numbers, however, are comparable across the two samples. All variables discussed in the following are defined in
We start with the stock price reaction to sudden deaths of CEOs or presidents. Average and median abnormal returns are found to be negative, close to zero, and volatile. Median (mean) CAR (-1,1)_FF3 is -0.5% (-0.4%), with a standard deviation of 10%. While some sudden deaths are associated with large declines in stock prices (as suggested by the 25 th percentile which amounts to -4.2%), others are associated with large increases (the 75 th percentile is +2.6%). Abnormal returns calculated with the single-factor or four-factor model reveal a similar picture. This heterogeneity of abnormal stock returns is consistent with the literature (see Johnson et al., 1985; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2014; Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth, 2016) and suggests that executive characteristics as well as labor market and corporate governance frictions (consistent with increasing stock prices) have potential explanatory power for the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths.
With regard to the characteristics of suddenly deceased CEOs and presidents, Panel B of Table   1 reports a median general ability index (GAI index) of -0.16. Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) report a median GAI index of -0.18. The small difference to the median we report for our sample can be explained by the authors' focus on later years (their sample starts in 1993) and on companies covered by BoardEx. Median (mean) executive age is 60 (59) Turning to firm and corporate governance characteristics, the average firm in our sample went public 21 years prior to the sudden death event (based on the CRSP inclusion date), has a firm size in terms of total assets of $2,518 million (median $220 million), and a market-to-book ratio of 2.4.
Return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items to total assets, has a mean (median)
of -3% (4%). Mean (median) ROA based on EBITDA is 4% (10%) (not reported for brevity). On average, board size is 8.5 directors, with 45% of the directors being neither insiders nor grey directors (63% post SOX). 36% of all firms have boards with staggered election terms and 69% of all CEOs also hold the title of the chairman of the board (Duality).
Determinants and development of the GAI index
We now present a more detailed analysis of the GAI index to provide the reader with a better understanding of our measure of general managerial skills. We first consider the development of general managerial skills over time. As can be seen from Next, we analyze the determinants of the GAI index. In specification (3), we repeat the regression from specification (2) and additionally include Tenure.
Specification (4) further includes the variables Board size, Duality, Independent board and
Staggered board as controls for corporate governance quality and CEO power. Finally, specifications (5) and (6) use GAI unweighted and Generalist as dependent variables, respectively.
Consistent with the way the GAI index is constructed and with the results in Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013), we find a significantly positive (negative) relation between an executive's age (tenure) and the variable GAI index. In specification (2), where we omit the variable Tenure, we also find that founders (or their offspring) are associated with lower GAI index values, as expected.
Further, both CEOs (as compared to other executives) and executives with prior work experience in consulting or law firms are associated with significantly higher GAI values. The latter result is in line with the career paths of many consultants and business lawyers who, after some years on the job, start working for one of their previous clients. Regarding firm and governance characteristics, our results provide some evidence that executives with higher general managerial skills are (weakly) associated with larger, less profitable, and better governed firms.
General managerial skills and shareholder value
In this section, we examine the impact of general managerial skills on shareholder value. We regress measures of the abnormal stock price reaction to announcements of sudden deaths, i.e.,
CAR (-1,1)_MM and CAR (-1,1)_FF3, on measures of general managerial skills (the GAI index
and its components) and additional control variables. We hypothesize that executives' general managerial skills have a positive effect on shareholder value as they facilitate management and leadership. If general managerial skills are indeed beneficial for shareholders, we expect to find a statistically significant, negative regression coefficient of the variable GAI index, which reflects a reduction in shareholder value resulting from the unexpected loss of an executive with valuable and costly-to-replace skills.
General ability index
In Table 3 we present a first attempt to test the above hypothesis. We regress abnormal stock returns on Firm size and either the GAI index (in Panel A and C) or the indicator variable Generalist (in Panel B). We run these regressions using the sample of all deceased executives and subsamples of i) CEOs and presidents, ii) CEOs, and iii) chairmen who were neither CEOs nor presidents.6 We control for firm size to take into account that the loss of corporate talent likely has a stronger impact on stock prices of smaller companies as they may find it harder to attract new (skilled) executives.
Supporting our hypothesis, the coefficients of both GAI index and Generalist have the expected negative sign and are statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) throughout all regression specifications, except for the subsamples of chairmen. This finding suggests that general managerial skills are particularly valuable for CEOs and presidents who need these skills in their day-to-day business and who have a more direct impact on shareholder value than chairmen.
Accordingly, we focus on CEOs and presidents in most of the following analyses. The results in Table 3 further suggest that the effect of general managerial skills on shareholder value is economically meaningful and is strongest for CEOs, who have the most direct impact on firms.
Particularly, a one-standard-deviation increase in the GAI index is associated with an average decline in abnormal stock returns of about 1.1 percentage points for the full sample, whereas the stock price decline amounts to at least 1.7 percentage points for CEOs.
As a next step, we incorporate additional executive, firm, and corporate governance characteristics into our analyses to account for potential covariates of our measures of general managerial skills. The results presented in Section 2.5 suggest that the general ability index particularly correlates with executive characteristics, such as age and tenure, which are likely to affect how the stock market reacts to an executive's unexpected death (see, e.g., Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth, 2016). Not accounting for value-relevant covariates of the GAI index may thus lead us to draw biased or even wrong inferences about both the statistical and economic significance of general managerial skills. Consequently, in Table 4 we show results from regressions of CAR (-managerial skills could benefit shareholders as they may provide valuable advice and monitoring due to their diverse backgrounds in managerial work experience and as they may step in as CEOs when incumbent CEOs leave the firm. The second reason is that many studies on sudden executive deaths include chairmen (see, e.g., Worrell et al., 1986; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Salas, 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2014 As can be seen from Table 4 , the results of all seven regressions corroborate our hypothesis that executives' general managerial skills have a positive impact on shareholder value. This conclusion is supported by all four measures of general managerial ability, i.e., our primary measure GAI index, used in regression specifications (1), (2), (3) and (7), Generalist (in specification 4), GAI unweighted (in specification 5), and the variable Residual GAI index (in specification 6) which takes the value effects of executive characteristics into account. The regression coefficients of all general ability measures are significant at the 5% level or better.
Accounting for additional control variables, a one-standard-deviation increase in the GAI index is associated with an average decline in abnormal stock returns of at least 1.9 percentage points for the sample of CEOs and presidents. Results remain significant, both statistically and economically, when we use the full sample or the sample of CEOs in unreported regressions. Our results further indicate that general managerial ability is not only an economically meaningful, but also a statistically meaningful explanator of abnormal stock returns to sudden executive deaths. For example, the inclusion of the variable GAI index leads to a relative increase in adjusted R-squared of 23% and 15% when we compare regression specifications (1) and (2) in Panel A and in Panel C of Table 3 , respectively. Regarding Table 4 where we account for covariates of the GAI index, the relative increase in the adjusted R-squared for specification (1), which uses the full sample, estimated with and without the GAI index amounts to 9%, while it amounts to 15% for specification (2) which is based on the restricted sample of CEOs and presidents (not reported for brevity).
Overall, the analyses shown in this section suggest that generalist executives are beneficial for corporate shareholders and that the effect of general managerial skills on shareholder value is both economically and statistically meaningful.
GAI index components
We complement our results on the value of executives' general managerial skills by a separate examination of the components of the general ability index (described in Section 2.2). To this end, we reestimate regression specification (3) of Table 4 
Robustness
Although an examination of the stock market reaction to sudden executive deaths mitigates endogeneity concerns already to a large extent, in this section we perform several additional tests to check the robustness of our results beyond the inclusion of basic control variables. These tests are motivated and presented in the following.
Addressing outliers
One important concern with most sudden death event studies is that the results might be driven by outliers due to the limited number of executives who die unexpectedly (small samples) and, in particular, the large variation in abnormal stock returns (see Section 2.4). We address this concern in two ways. The respective results are shown in Table 6 . First, in regression specifications (1) and (2) we run median regressions which minimize the sum of absolute (instead of squared) residuals.
In specifications (3) and (4) 
Alternative explanations
Another important concern is that general managerial skills might correlate with other (confounding) variables relevant for shareholder value, for example, other managerial attributes.
That means, we might falsely attribute the previous results on shareholder value to generalists although they are actually just the outcome of attributes that many generalists share or the result of other potential spurious regressions. Hence, in Table 7 and Table 8 we show results of regressions where we reestimate specification (3) of Table 4 and include additional controls to account for alternative explanations.
In Table 7 , we start with the probably most obvious alternative explanation: the general ability index might capture executives' innate talent which may be both beneficial for shareholders and costly to replace. To address this concern, we use two established measures of executive talent. In specification (1), we restrict the sample to suddenly deceased CEOs and control for the variable First CEO age which measures the age at which a CEO became CEO for the first time. We report a median First CEO age of 48 years similar to Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) who propose to use this variable as a control for CEOs' innate talent.7 Because the age at which an executive became CEO for the first time is not available for all observations in our sample and because it is not an optimal measure of innate talent for executives other than the CEO, in specification (2) we use the variable Tenure/age, proposed by Bhagat and Bolton (2013) . It is defined as the ratio of a deceased executive's tenure to its age (both at the time of his or her death). The longer an executive has been in a top position relative to his or her age, the more talented the executive is likely to be.
In specifications (3) and (4), we address time trends as another alternative explanation. Using a sample of executive sudden deaths between 1950 and 2009 , Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2016 provide evidence that the value of executives and/or their impact on the firms they run has increased over time. Given the positive time trend of the general ability index we report in Figure   2 , our evidence of a positive valuation effect of general managerial skills might just reflect the generally increasing value (and impact) of executives over time. Therefore, in specification (3) we control for the variable Year, which is a count variable that takes on values between 1980 and 2012, while in specification (4) we control for time fixed effects using four dummy variables, one for each decade of our sample period (i.e., 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s) . Finally, in specification (5) we simultaneously control for CEO talent, the time trend as well as for industry fixed effects based on the Fama and French 10 industry classification.
As can be seen from Table 7 , the coefficient for GAI index remains negative and significant at the 5% level or better throughout all five regression specifications. The economic magnitude of general managerial skills also remains significant. An increase in the GAI index by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in abnormal stock returns of 1.8 to 2.1 percentage points.
Even when we additionally include industry fixed effects in specification (5), the economic effect still amounts to 1.5 percentage points. In unreported regressions, we find that the regression coefficient of GAI index remains statistically and economically significant when we use industry fixed effects based on the Fama and French 48 industry classification.
We now turn to to control for executives' networks. As Table 8 shows, in all four regression specifications the coefficient for GAI index remains significant, both statistically and economically.
Overall, from the results presented in this section we conclude that the positive impact of general managerial skills on shareholder value is unlikely to be attributed to the aforementioned alternative explanations.
Further robustness tests
In the following, we consider several additional robustness tests. As a first test, we examine the role of executive succession and the impact of different causes of sudden deaths. To this end, we reestimate regression specification (3) of Table 4 for different subsamples. The regression results are shown in Table 9 . For brevity, we only report the coefficient for the variable GAI index, the respective t-statistic and the number of observations.
As an intuitive test of our hypothesis that generalist executives benefit shareholder value, we exclude all cases of sudden deaths in which a deceased executive is permanently replaced by an outsider (i.e., the variable Successor is firm insider equals one for all remaining observations).
Given that insiders tend to have less general managerial ability (see Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013) and given that the stock market reaction to announcements of executives' unexpected deaths incorporates the expected likelihood that the deceased executive will be replaced by an insider, we should find a more negative average abnormal stock return for the subsample of inside replacements if generalists matter for shareholder value. The results in specification (1) confirm our expectation. The stock market reaction is indeed more negative (the coefficient amounts to -0.0256) and also statistically more significant (1% level) than the results shown in specification (3) of Table 4 . Specifically, the economic effect is 28% larger on a relative basis.
The above finding implies that our results might be driven by firms which find it hard to replace valuable executive talent. If this was the case, the results of our study would not be generalizable.
We address this concern in regression specifications (2), (3) and (4) where we exclude small firms (with below median firm size by total assets or market value) and young firms (with below median age), respectively. Smaller and younger firms should find it particularly difficult to replace executive talent. The regression coefficient for GAI index remains statistically significant in all three regressions, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by firms that find it hard to recruit valuable executives.9
Finally, in regression specification (5) of Table 9 , we exclude cases of sudden deaths if the cause of death is a heart attack or if it is unknown (i.e., it could be a heart attack or heart failure).
One might argue that heart attacks can be related to previous firm performance, which would render these deaths 'less exogenous' events. The regression coefficient for GAI index remains significant (at the 10% level) when we restrict the sample to sudden deaths caused by accidents and strokes, which are probably the most unexpected and sudden death events. In unreported regressions, we exclude only those cases of sudden deaths for which i) the cause of death is unknown or ii) the cause of death is a heart attack, separately. Results remain statistically significant.
As a second robustness test, shown in Table 10 , we reestimate regression specifications from Table 4 and include additional control variables. We use Successor is firm insider to account for the fact that the stock market reaction to unexpected executive deaths incorporates information about the expected successor of a suddenly deceased executive. In this regard, we argue that if the permanent successor was a firm insider, it is more likely that a succession plan existed at the time the sudden executive death took place. To further control for succession, we include the dummy President to account for cases where the deceased CEO held the president title, i.e., succession was unlikely to be planned as "the baton had not yet been passed" to the heir apparent (see Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005, p.1409). We also control for the variable Ownership20% (following Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) which equals one if a deceased executive owned more than 9 We note that the coefficient for GAI index is considerably larger when we restrict the sample to larger firms in specifications (2) and (3). This results is consistent with a competitive sorting model of the executive labor market where better executives with more skills tend to run bigger companies because the marginal impact of executive talent can be expected to increase in firm size (see Falato, Li, and Milbourn, 2015 , and the literature therein). In this regard, we provide multivariate evidence for a positive relation between general managerial skills and firm size in Successor is firm insider seem to add additional explanatory power for abnormal stock returns. The positive coefficient of the latter variable is consistent with a less negative stock price reaction to sudden deaths when executive succession plans (are more likely to) exist.
Finally, Appendix C shows regression results of reestimations of regression specification (3) of Table 4 with alternative measures of abnormal stock returns, i.e., alternative dependent variables.
In particular, we use SCAR (-1,1) and CAR (-1,1)_4F in specifications (1) and (2), respectively, while we use CAR (-1,1)_FF3 winsorized and CAR (-1,1)_MM winsorized in specification (3) and specification (4). We winsorize all variables at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles. Finally, in specification (5), which is estimated using a probit model, we use CAR (-1,1)_MM < 0 (dummy), an indicator variable that equals one if the market-model abnormal return is below zero. Again, throughout all regressions the coefficient for GAI index remains statistically significant.
Difficult corporate tasks and the value of general managerial skills
Sections 3 and 4 have provided robust evidence that general managerial skills, on average, have a positive effect on shareholder value. In this section, we present additional evidence on the relation between general managerial skills, the management of difficult corporate tasks, and shareholder value. We thereby provide some insights with regard to the question for which firms generalist executives are particularly valuable.
We build our analysis on Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos' (2013) finding (and reasoning) that the pay premium for generalists is higher when CEOs are hired to perform difficult tasks, such as restructurings, which often necessitate adapting to changing business environments. This finding suggests that generalist executives can be expected to be particularly valuable (and thus firms are willing to pay them a premium) when firms have to undergo drastic changes, like necessary disinvestments (e.g., asset sales and plant closures), and when they need to seek new investment opportunities. General managerial skills can facilitate corporate management and leadership in such situations as generalists tend to be better able to adapt to changing business environments (see Guay, Taylor, and Xiao, 2014) and as generalists may find it easier to identify new growth prospects (in line with the anecdotal evidence in footnote 1). Furthermore, broad managerial work experience likely fosters necessary problem solving at the top and coordination with several people inside and outside the firm when situations become difficult and corporate circumstances change.
Because firms with more growth prospects are less likely to be in need of performing difficult tasks and because they less likely have to seek for new investments , we hypothesize that the value of general managerial skills is higher (lower) when firms have fewer (more) growth opportunities.
To test the aforementioned hypothesis, we use several measures of firms' growth opportunities proposed by the existing literature (see, e.g., Adam and Goyal, 2008) : the market-to-book ratio (MTB), Tobin's Q, and capital expenditures to net property plant and equipment (CapEx/NetPPE).
We further use return on assets (ROA) as an alternative (however more biased and indirect) measure for a firm's need to undergo changes and adapt to new business environments. To identify whether general managerial skills matter more when firms have fewer growth opportunities, we use interaction terms of our growth measures (and ROA) with the variable GAI index. If our hypothesis is true, we have to find significantly positive interaction terms in addition to the negative coefficient for GAI index, indicating that general managerial skills are less valuable when firms have more growth opportunities.
The results of our tests are shown in Table 11 . We reestimate regression specification (3) of 
Conclusion
In this study, we test the hypothesis that executives' general managerial skills benefit shareholder value as they facilitate management and leadership of modern corporations.
Supporting the above hypothesis, we document a significantly positive and economically meaningful effect of general managerial skills on shareholder value using 171 sudden executive deaths between 1980 and 2012. In particular, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the general ability index is found to correspond to at least a 1.5 percentage point decrease in abnormal 26 stock returns to announcements of sudden deaths. Our findings further suggest that generalist executives are particularly valuable for firms with fewer growth prospects where the need to perform difficult tasks (e.g., restructurings) and to adapt to new business environments is considerably higher.
The positive impact of executives' general managerial skills on shareholder value found in this paper provides a market-based explanation for the documented hiring and pay premium that generalists receive and the increase of general managerial skills over the last decades (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004 
Table 2 -Determinants of the GAI index
This table reports results from regressions of the variable GAI index (in regression specifications 1-4) or GAI unweighted (in specification 5) or Generalist (in specification 6) on characteristics of the deceased executives, firm and governance characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Regression specifications (1) - (5) are estimated using OLS, while specification (6) is estimated using a probit regression model. Consult or Law Exp. is omitted in specification (6) as it perfectly predicts the dependent indicator variable Generalist. t-statistics are estimated using robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. (1) and (2) are median regressions. Regression specifications (3) and (4) are basic OLS regressions. Specification (3) excludes observations if i) CAR (-1,1)_FF3 is smaller than or equal to the 5 th percentile, ii) CAR (-1,1)_FF3 is larger than or equal to the 95 th percentile, iii) GAI index is smaller than or equal to the 5 th percentile, iv) GAI index is larger than or equal to the 95 th percentile. Specification (4) excludes observations if i) CAR (-1,1)_FF3 is smaller than or equal to the 5 th percentile, ii) CAR (-1,1)_FF3 is larger than or equal to the 95 th percentile, iii) GAI unweighted is smaller than or equal to the 5 th percentile, iv) GAI unweighted is larger than or equal to the 95 th percentile. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are estimated using robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dep. Variable:
GAI index GAI unweighted Generalist (dummy) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(6)
CAR (-1,1)_FF3
Median regressions Exclusion of outliers 
Appendix B -Variable definitions
This table provides an overview and detailed definitions of the variables used in this study. Accounting data refers to the previous fiscal year and is winsorized at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles.
Variable Definition
Abnormal returns: CAR (-1,1) Cumulative abnormal return between t-1 and t+1 where t is the date of death or the next trading day in case death took place on a non-trading day. Estimated using either the market model (denoted as CAR (-1,1)_MM) or multi-factor models (CAR (-1,1)_FF3 or CAR (-1,1)_4F ). SCAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) divided by a firm's standard deviation of abnormal stock returns from the event study estimation window. Estimated using the market model. Outside directorships Natural logarithm of the number of external board seats a deceased executive held.
Successor is firm insider Dummy equaling 1 if the deceased executive's permanent successor is a firm insider, 0 otherwise.
Tenure
Tenure of the deceased executive at the time of his or her death.
Uni degree
The deceased executive's education. The variable Uni degree takes the values 0 (no degree), 1 (Bachelor), 2 (Master), 3 (PhD).
Firm characteristics:
CapEx/NetPPE Capital expenditures divided by net property plant and equipment (PPE) (winsorized).
Firm age (CRSP) Firm age since IPO (based on the CRSP inclusion date).
Firm size Logarithm of a firm's total assets (ln(assets)).
Leverage Total liabilities to total assets (winsorized).
MTB Market-to-book ratio, constructed as the ratio of the market value of equity to the difference between assets and liabilities (winsorized). ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets (winsorized).
R&D Ratio of R&D expenses to total assets (winsorized).
Tobin's Q (Market value of equity + preferred stock + total liabilities) / total assets (winsorized).
Governance characteristics:
Board size The number of directors on the firm's board of directors.
Duality
Dummy equaling 1 if the deceased was the firm's CEO and chairman, 0 otherwise.
Independent board
Dummy equaling 1 if the firm's board of directors is truly independent, i.e., the majority of directors are neither insiders, nor grey directors, 0 otherwise. Staggered board Dummy equaling 1 if the firm's board of directors has staggered election terms, 0 otherwise.
